A minimum cost spanning tree game is called ultrametric if the cost function on the edges of the underlying network is ultrametric. We show that every ultrametric minimum cost spanning tree game is a cost allocation game on a rooted tree. It follows that there exist optimal algorithms for computing the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation of the ultrametric minimum cost spanning tree games.
Introduction
Let N = {1, · · · , n}, where n ≥ 1 is an integer. Suppose that K N ′ is the complete graph whose vertex set is N ′ = N ∪ {0} and function w which assigns a nonnegative cost w(e) to each edge e of K N ′ is given. A minimum cost spanning tree game (MCST game for short) is a cooperative (cost) game (N, c w ) defined as follows: for S ⊆ N define c w (S) as the cost of a minimum spanning tree of the subgraph of K N ′ induced by S ∪ {0}. Bird [2] showed that core of an MCST game is always nonempty by explicitly constructing a core allocation, which is often called a Bird allocation (also see [8] ). An ultrametric MCST game is an MCST game where the cost function w on the edges of the underling graph is an ultrametric, i.e., for each distinct i, j, k ∈ N ′ we have w(i, k) ≤ max{w(i, j), w(j, k)}.
In [2] , Bird also showed that the core of any MCST game (N, c w ) contains the core of another MCST game (N, cw) associated with the cost functionw, where for each i, j ∈ N ′ w(i, j) is defined as the maximum of w(k, l) over all the edges (k, l) in the path from i to j in some minimum cost spanning tree of K N ′ . Bird called the latter core the irreducible core. The cost functionw is known to be an ultrametric (see [18] ), and conversely, each ultrametric function is derived in this way (see [17] ). The irreducible core of an MCST game (N, c w ) and the associated game (N, cw) have been studied by many authors (e.g. [2] , [1] , [14] and [18] ). In particular, it is known that game (N, cw) is submodular (or concave).
Cost allocation games on rooted trees are another class of cooperative (cost) games. Let T = (V, A) be a rooted tree whose set of leaves is N = {1, . . . , n} and let l be a function which assigns a nonnegative length l(a) to each edge a of T . For S ⊆ N define t l (S) as the total length of edges that belongs to some path from a leaf i ∈ S to the root. We call the resulting game (N, t l ) a cost allocation game on a rooted tree. This class of games are equivalent to the games studied by Megiddo [15] and the standard tree games [9] (see [12] ). Any cost allocation game on a rooted tree is submodular and there exist efficient algorithms for computing solutions like the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for them ([15] , [7] , [12] ).
In this paper, we show that any ultrametric MCST game can be represented as a cost allocation game on a rooted tree. It follows that for an ultrametric MCST game we can compute the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation in O(n 2 ) time. It should be noted here, in contrast, that computing solutions of a general MCST game are intractable: computing the nucleolus of the MCST games is NP-hard [5] and testing membership in the core of MCST games is co-NP-complete [4] . The complexity of computation of the Shapley value of the MCST games is still an open problem.
Basic definitions
In this section, we review definitions from cooperative game theory, and give definitions of ultrametric MCST games and cost allocation games on rooted trees.
Cooperative games
A cooperative (cost) game (N, c) is a pair of a finite set N = {1, · · · , n} and a function c: 2 N → R with c(∅) = 0. We call N = {1, · · · , n} the set of the players and function c is called the characteristic function. In the context of this paper, the value c(S) for S ⊆ N is interpreted as the total cost of some activity when only the members in S cooperate, so the direction of traditional inequalities in cooperative game theory is sometimes reversed.
A cooperative game (N, c) is subadditive if for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ we have
The core of the cooperative game (N, c) is defined as follows.
where x(S) = i∈S x(i) for S ⊆ N . The Shapley value Φ: N → R of game (N, c) is defined as
For a vector x ∈ R N let us denote byx the vector in R N obtained by rearranging the components of x in nondecreasing order. For vectorsx andỹ in R n we sayx is lexicographically greater thanỹ if there exists k = 1, · · · , n such thatx i =ỹ i (i = 1, · · · , k − 1) andx k >ỹ k . For a submodular game (N, c) the egalitarian allocation is the unique vector x in the core which lexicographically maximizesx over the core. The concept of egalitarian allocation for general cooperative games was introduced in [3] and that for concave games was studied in [6] .
For a cooperative game (N, c) and a vector x such that x(N ) = c(N ), the excess e(S, x) of x for subset S ⊆ N is defined as
Given a vector x with x(N ) = c(N ) let us denote by θ(x) the sequence of components e(S, x) (∅ ⊂ S ⊂ N ) arranged in order of nondecreasing magnitude. The nucleolus [16] of game (N, c) is defined to be the unique vector x which lexicographically maximizes θ(x) over all the vectors x with x(N ) = c(N ).
(Ultrametric) MCST games
Let K N ′ be the complete graph with vertex set N ′ = {0, 1, · · · , n} and let w:
For each S ⊆ N we write S ′ = S ∪ {0}. The minimum cost spanning tree game (or MCST game for short) associated with network (K N ′ , w) is a cooperative game (N, c w ) defined by
where K S ′ is the subgraph of K N ′ induced by S ′ . The core of an MCST game is always nonempty. Indeed, a vector called a Bird allocation [2] is in the core (see [8] ). It is easy to see that an MCST game is subadditive. However, an MCST game is not submodular in general.
A function w:
Equivalently, w is an ultrametric if and only if for each distinct i, j, k ∈ N ′ the maximum of w(i, j), w(j, k), w(i, k) is attained by at least two pairs. An MCST game (N, c w ) is called ultrametric if w is an ultrametric. It can be shown that every ultrametric MCST game is submodular.
Cost allocation game on rooted trees
Let T = (V, A) be an undirected tree with root r and the set of leaves being N = {1, . . . , n}. Let l: A → R + be a function on A. We call such a pair (T, l) a rooted tree.
Denote by A i the set of edges on the unique path from i to r and for each S ⊆ N define A S by A S = i∈S A i . Then, the cost allocation game (N, t l ) on a rooted tree (T, l) is defined by
It is easy to see that any cost allocation game (N, t l ) on a rooted tree is submodular. Megiddo [15] showed that the Shapley value and the nucleolus of any cost allocation game on a rooted tree can be found in O(n) and O(n 3 ), respectively. Galil [7] improved the latter time bound to O(n log n). Iwata and Zuiki [12] showed that the core of any cost allocation game on a rooted tree can be represented as the set of feasible flows of a network and gave O(n log n) algorithms for computing the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation. Summarizing, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (Megiddo [15] , Galil [7] , Iwata and Zuiki [12] ) For each cost allocation game (N, t l ) on a rooted tree the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation can be computed in O(n), O(n log n) and O(n log n) time, respectively.
The reduction
Let (T, l) be a rooted tree with root r and the set of leaves being M . Let us denote by d l (v, w) the length of the path from v to w in T with respect to function l: A → R + . We call a rooted tree (T, l) equidistant if
(ii) for all (v, w) ∈ A with v, w ∈ M we have l(v, w) ≥ 0.
A rooted tree (T, l) with the set of leaves being M is said to represent a function w:
Lemma 3.1 (cf. Gusfield [10] ) For a function w: N ′ × N ′ → R, w is an ultrametric if and only if there exists an equidistant rooted tree which represents w.
The statement of the following lemma can be found in [2] . (N, c w ) is an ultrametric MCST game associated with network (K N ′ , w). For S ⊆ N and i ∈ S we have
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that
where j * ∈ S ′ is such that w(i, j * ) = min{w(i, j) |j ∈ S ′ }.
(Proof) Let Γ be a minimum cost spanning tree of K S ′ . It suffices to show that Γ∪{(i, j * )} is a minimum cost spanning tree of K S ′ ∪{i} . For j ∈ S ′ with j = j * let us consider the path
from j * to j in Γ. By the definition of j * , we have w(i, j * ) ≤ w(i, j). Then, since w is an ultrametric, we must have w(j, j * ) ≤ w(i, j). Since Γ is a minimum cost spanning tree of K S ′ we must have
Therefore, we have
Hence, it follows from the optimality condition of the minimum cost spanning tree [13, Theorem 6.2] that Γ ∪ {(i, j * )} is a minimum cost spanning tree of K S ′ ∪{i} as required.
Theorem 3.3 For each ultrametric MCST game (N, c w ) there exists a cost allocation game (N, c l ) on a rooted tree (T, l) such that
(Proof) Let (N, c w ) be an ultrametric MCST game, where w: N ′ × N ′ → R is an ultrametric. By Lemma 3.1, there exists an equidistant rooted tree (
is on the path from 0 to the root, 2l
. (15) and let us consider the rooted tree (T ′ , l). It suffices to show that
since the desired rooted tree (T, l) can be derived by contracting all the edges on the path from 0 to the root of T ′ , where we let the newly created vertex be the root of T , provided that we have (16) .
We prove (16) by induction on |S|. For S = ∅ this is trivial. If S = {i} for some i ∈ N , then we have
since (T ′ , l ′ ) represents w. Let 1 ≤ |S| < n and i ∈ N − S. We will show c w (
and let v * ∈ V be the least common ancestor of i and j * in T ′ . Let
be the path from i to v * in T ′ . Then, we have
Claim. For all p = 1, · · · , k, if a p ∈ A S ′ , then we have l(a p ) = 0.
(Proof) Suppose that a p ∈ A S ′ and l(a p ) > 0 for some p = 1, · · · , k. Then, since a p ∈ A S ′ , vertex v p−1 is a common ancestor of i and some ∈ S ′ . Then, by l(a p ) > 0 we must have w(i,) < w(i, j * ), which contradicts the choice (18) of j * . (End of the proof of the Claim)
It follows from Lemma 3.2, the induction hypothesis and the Claim that
which completes the proof of the present theorem.
We have the following corollary from Theorem 3.3.
Corollary 3.4 For any ultrametric MCST game the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation can be computed in O(n 2 ) time.
(Proof) Given an ultrametric function w, we can construct the equidistant tree (T ′ , l ′ ) which represents w in O(n 2 ) time (see [10] , [11] ). Then, by Lemma 2.1, the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation of the game (N, t l ) can be found in time dominated by O(n 2 ). Therefore, we have O(n 2 ) time bound for computations of all these solutions.
We have seen that any ultrametric MCST game can be represented as a cost allocation game on a rooted tree (T, l). The rooted tree (T, l) can be derived from an equidistant rooted tree (T ′ , l ′ ) by compressing the path from 0 to the root. We call such a rooted tree nearly equidistant. More precisely, a rooted tree (T, l) is called nearly equidistant if for each immediate descendant v of the root of T , the subtree rooted at v is equidistant. Note that an equidistant rooted tree is nearly equidistant. Theorem 3.5 For each ultrametric MCST game (N, c w ) there exists a cost allocation game (N, t l ) on a nearly equidistant rooted tree (T, l) such that c w = t l . Conversely, for each cost allocation game (N, t l ) on a nearly equidistant rooted tree (T, l), there exists an ultrametric MCST game (N, c w ) such that c w = t l .
(Proof) The first statement follows from Theorem 3.3.
We prove the second statement. Let (T, l) be a nearly equidistant rooted tree whose set of leaves is N . Let v p (p = 0, 1, · · · , k) be the immediate descendants of the root r and let T p be the equidistant subtree rooted at v p (p = 0, 1, · · · , k). For each p = 0, 1, · · · , k let us denote by δ p the distance d l (i, r) from a leaf i of T p to the root r. We can assume without loss of generality that δ 0 ≥ δ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ δ k .
Define a rooted tree (T ′ = (V ′ , A ′ ), l ′ ) as follows. 
It is easy to see that rooted tree (T ′ , l ′ ) thus defined is equidistant, and hence, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that there exists ultrametric w: N ′ × N ′ → R which is represented by (T ′ , l ′ ). The construction of (T, l) in the proof of Theorem 3.3 shows that we have c w = t l .
Conclusion
We showed that any ultrametric MCST game can be represented as a cost allocation game on a rooted tree. The reduction is done in time O(n 2 ) time and it follows that the Shapley value, the egalitarian allocation and the nucleolus of an ultrametric MCST game can be computed in time O(n 2 ).
